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MODAL MODEL THEORY
JOEL DAVID HAMKINS AND WOJCIECH ALEKSANDER WO LOSZYN
Abstract. We introduce the subject of modal model theory, where one stud-
ies a mathematical structure within a class of similar structures under an
extension concept that gives rise to mathematically natural notions of possi-
bility and necessity. A statement ϕ is possible in a structure (written ϕ) if
ϕ is true in some extension of that structure, and ϕ is necessary (written ϕ)
if it is true in all extensions of the structure. A principal case for us will be
the class Mod(T ) of all models of a given theory T—all graphs, all groups,
all fields, or what have you—considered under the substructure relation. In
this article, we aim to develop the resulting modal model theory. The class
of all graphs is a particularly insightful case illustrating the remarkable power
of the modal vocabulary, for the modal language of graph theory can express
connectedness, k-colorability, finiteness, countability, size continuum, size ℵ1,
ℵ2, ℵω , iω , first i-fixed point, first i-hyper-fixed-point and much more. A
graph obeys the maximality principle ϕ(a) → ϕ(a) with parameters if and
only if it satisfies the theory of the countable random graph, and it satisfies
the maximality principle for sentences if and only if it is universal for finite
graphs.
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1. Introduction
In modal model theory, we consider a mathematical structure within the context
of a class of similar structures, investigating the nature of possibility and necessity
as one extends to larger structures. In the general case, we have a potentialist
system, which is a class W of models in a common language together with an
extension relation M ⊑ N refining the substructure relation, and we define the
natural modal operators:
Commentary can be made about this article on the first author’s blog at
http://jdh.hamkins.org/modal-model-theory.
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(1) A model M in W thinks ϕ is possible, written M |= ϕ, if there is an
extension M ⊑ N with N |= ϕ.
(2) A modelM inW thinks ϕ is necessary, writtenM |= ϕ, if every extension
M ⊑ N has N |= ϕ.
In modal model theory, we focus particularly on the case of W = Mod(T ), the
potentialist system consisting of all the models of a given first-order theory T ,
considered under the submodel relation. We shall consider all graphs, all groups, all
fields, or what have you, considering each model in the context of all models of the
corresponding theory. By augmenting the languages with these modal operators,
every first-order language and theory thus extends canonically to a modal language
and theory, whose basic model theory and expressive power we aim to investigate.
To illustrate the modal vocabulary, observe that in the class of all graphs, every
graph thinks “possibly the diameter is 2,” since any graph can be extended to
include a new vertex having suitable edges with the previous nodes so as to make
the diameter of the larger graph exactly 2; in the class of all groups, every group
is possibly necessarily non-abelian, since every group is a subgroup of a nonabelian
group, all of whose further extensions will be non-abelian; and in fields, possibly
every element is a square, but this statement is necessarily not necessary.
For clarity let us be precise about the various distinct but closely related lan-
guages we shall treat in this article.
(1) We denote by L the language of the structures in the potentialist system
W . In the case of Mod(T ), this is the language of the theory T .
(2) L is the closure of L under the modal operators , and Boolean con-
nectives (but not quantifiers).
(3) L is the full first-order modal language, closing L under modal operators,
Boolean connectives and quantifiers.
(4) L ,@ extends the full modal language with the actuality operator @, ex-
plained in section 8.
(5) P is the language of propositional modal logic, with propositional variables
p, q, r, and so on, closed under Boolean connectives and modal operators.
The assertions of L are exactly those assertions of L in which no modal operator
falls under the scope of a quantifier; these are the same as the substitution instances
ϕ(ψ0, . . . , ψn), where ϕ(p0, . . . , pn) is a propositional modal assertion in P and each
ψi is an assertion of the first-order language L. Our results in section 3 will show
that much of the classical model theory extends from the base language L to L,
but not to L , which is why we separate out this language fragment. For example,
theorem 20 shows that L obeys the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorem in Mod(T ), but
L does not in general.
The potentialist system terminology was introduced in [HL19], with additional
related work in [HW17, HW19, Ham18] analyzing the modal logic of models of
arithmetic and set theory. The modal analysis of forcing extensions in set theory
had begun earlier with [Ham03] and continued with [HL08, HL13, HLL15].
2. The remarkable expressive power of modal graph theory
Let us begin our project by illustrating the remarkable expressive power of the
modal language of graph theory. We work in the class of all graphs, where a graph
is a set of vertices and an irreflexive, symmetric binary edge relation ∼. (So, there
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are no self-edges and no parallel edges.) Let L∼ be the first-order language of graph
theory, which has only the binary edge relation ∼.
Theorem 1. In the class of graphs, 2-colorability is expressible in the modal lan-
guage of graph theory. There is a sentence ρ2 ∈ L∼ such that for any graph
G,
G |= ρ2 if and only if G is 2-colorable.
Similarly, k-colorability is expressible by a sentence ρk for any finite k.
Proof. We claim that a graph G is 2-colorable if and only if possibly, there are
adjacent nodes r and b, such that every node is adjacent to exactly one of them
and adjacent nodes are connected to them oppositely.
G
→
G
r b
If we think of the neighbors of r as red and the neighbors of b as blue, any such graph
extension will be 2-colorable. (Note that this coloring assignment will actually color
r blue and b red, since they are neighbors of each other and not of themselves.)
Conversely, if the graph is 2-colorable, then we can add new vertices r and b and
join with edges according to the coloring. A similar idea works for k-colorings with
any finite number k. 
One might notice that in the particular figure of the proof, we needn’t actually
have added any nodes at all, since we could have used the bottom two nodes as b
and r to realize the property already in the original graph.
Theorem 2. In the class of graphs, connectivity of nodes is expressible in the modal
language of graph theory. There is a formula χ(x, y) in L∼ expressing that vertex
x is connected to vertex y.
G |= χ(x, y) if and only if x is connected to y in G.
Similarly, there is a sentence in L∼ expressing that the graph as a whole is con-
nected.
Proof. Vertex x is connected with y if and only if there is a finite path in the graph
from x to y. This is equivalent to asserting in the modal language that necessarily,
any vertex c that is adjacent to x and whose neighbors are closed under adjacency
is also adjacent to y. This can be expressed in the modal language of graph theory
by the formula χ(x, y) as follows:
∀c[(c ∼ x ∧ ∀u, v(c ∼ u ∧ u ∼ v ∧ v 6= c→ c ∼ v))→ c ∼ y].
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To illustrate, consider the graph pictured here at left in black, where vertex x is in
fact connected to vertex y.
x
y
→
x
y
c
Consider an extension as at right with a vertex c that is adjacent to x, whose
neighbors are closed under adjacency. Inductively c will be adjacent to every vertex
on the path from x to y, and consequently it will be adjacent to y. Conversely, in
any graph where x is not connected to y, we may extend it to a graph with a new
node c adjacent to every vertex in the connected component of x and to no others.
This node will be adjacent to x and its neighbors will be closed under adjacency,
but it will not be adjacent to y. So the formula will hold in a graph precisely when
x is connected to y. For a nonempty graph as a whole to be connected, it should
satisfy ∀x∀y χ(x, y). 
Notice that by relativizing the expression, we can express the connectivity of any
particular definable subgraph of a graph, such as the set of neighbors of a given
node.
It is a standard model-theoretic exercise to show that neither 2-colorability nor
connectivity for graphs is expressible in the ordinary language of graph theory, and
so these observations show that the expressive power of modal graph theory L∼
strictly exceeds first-order graph theory. Let us continue—far more is expressible
with the modal vocabulary.
Theorem 3. In the class of graphs, finiteness is expressible in the modal language
of graph theory. There is a sentence φ ∈ L∼ such that for any graph G,
G |= φ if and only if G is finite.
Proof. A graph G is finite if and only if possibly, there is a point n, whose neighbor
graph is connected, with all vertices of degree 2 within that neighbor set, except
exactly two vertices of degree 1 in that neighbor set—a starting node and an ending
node—and all other nodes of the graph are adjacent to exactly one neighbor of n
in a bijective correspondence. The neighbors of n will form a finite chain from the
starting vertex to the ending vertex, and the bijection will show that the graph is
finite.
G
→
G
n
start end
Since the neighbor graph of vertex n is connected, it cannot have an infinite number
of neighbors, for when proceeding successively from the start node through the in-
termediate nodes of degree 2, one must come to the end node in finitely many steps,
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for otherwise the start and end nodes will occupy different connected components,
contrary to assumption. So n really does have only finitely many neighbors under
those assumptions, and so the graph will be finite.
Note that when employing the “possibly” operator, the original graph also may
get larger, and so the bijection is not necessarily talking only about the original
graph in the extension with n, but possibly an extension of the original graph.
G
n
start end
But since a set is finite if and only if it has a finite extension, this is not a problem
for the assertion. 
Corollary 4. In the class of graphs, for a vertex to have finite degree is a property
expressible in the modal language of graph theory. There is a formula η(x) in L∼
that holds of a node x in a graph G if and only if x has finite degree in G.
Proof. This is a consequence of the previous theorem, by relativizing to the sub-
graph consisting of the neighbors of x. That is, η(x) asserts that possibly, there
is a node n whose neighbors are connected and all of degree 2 except a starting
node and an ending node, such that every neighbor of x is adjacent to a distinct
neighbor of n. 
Theorem 5. In the class of graphs, countability is expressible in the modal language
of graph theory. There is a sentence σ ∈ L∼ such that for any graph G,
G |= σ if and only if G is countable.
Proof. A graph G is countable if and only if possibly, there is a point ω, whose
neighbor graph is connected, with all vertices of degree 2 except exactly one starting
node with degree 1 (amongst the neighbors of ω)—so that these neighbor vertices
form an infinite linked chain from the starting node—and furthermore, all other
nodes in the graph are adjacent to distinct neighbors of ω.
G
· · · →
G
· · ·
ω
start · · ·
Note that the “possibly” clause includes the finite graphs. 
One can express “countably infinite” by saying that the graph is countable but
not finite. And uncountability is expressible simply as “not countable.” Let us
extend this by showing also that having size at most continuum is expressible.
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Theorem 6. In the class of graphs, the property of having size at most continuum c
is expressible in the modal language of graph theory. There is a sentence ψ≤c ∈ L∼
such that for any graph G,
G |= ψ≤c if and only if |G| ≤ c.
Proof. A graph G has size at most continuum if and only if we can associate every
node in the graph with a distinct subset of ω. This is expressible in the modal
language of graph theory as follows. The sentence ψ≤c asserts that possibly, there
is a node ω whose neighbors form a connected subgraph in which every node has
degree 2 except one initial node of degree 1 (within that neighbor graph), such
that all other nodes are adjacent to distinct subsets of the neighbors of ω. In other
words, for any two distinct nodes x and y not among ω and its neighbors, there is
a neighbor n of ω such that x is adjacent to n if and only if y is not adjacent to n,
as indicated in the figure here:
x y
ω
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
· · ·
n
In this way, every node of the original graph G is associated with a distinct set of
the neighbors of ω, and so G will have size at most continuum. 
Theorem 7. In the class of graphs, the property of having size exactly continuum
c is expressible in the modal language of graph theory. There is a sentence ψc ∈ L∼
such that for any graph G,
G |= ψc if and only if |G| = c.
Proof. This is a little subtler than one might expect—the difficulty is that when
one uses the possibility operator, new vertices can be added to the original graph,
and there is no way of telling which points are new and which are original. (This is
the main point of the actuality operator @ discussed in section 8.) Nevertheless, we
can express the property as follows. A graph G has size continuum if and only if it
has size at most continuum and necessarily, if the graph consists of a node A and its
neighbors (as in red below), then necessarily, in any extension having two connected
components (the other being a node B and its neighbors, as in brownish red), such
that the union has size at most continuum, then necessarily, in any extension in
which that is exhibited by an association as above of nodes with subsets of ω, then
possibly, in a further extension in which that remains true, there is another copy
of ω and a new association of the neighbors of A with distinct subsets of it, in such
MODAL MODEL THEORY 7
a way that every pattern for that copy of ω is realized by a node adjacent to A.
G
A
B
The point is that if G does have size continuum, then we can find the second desired
bijection with the subsets of ω. And if G does not have size continuum, then we
may extend G by adding a node A adjacent to every node in G and then add a
new node B along with continuum many neighbors, associating these with subsets
of ω in such a way so as to use up all the possible subsets—this will prevent A
from getting any new neighbors in an extension in which the neighbors of A and
B are still associated with distinct subsets, since all the patterns are used up. And
since there are fewer than continuum many neighbors of A, they cannot make an
association with subsets of a second copy of ω in such a way that every pattern is
realized. 
We have made a good start in this section on illustrating the expressive power
of modal graph theory, but we shall actually extend these results much further in
section 7, showing that having size ℵω or iω is expressible, as is having size the first
i-fixed point or the next or indeed the first i-hyperfixed-point and much more.
3. Some elementary modal model theory
Let us now begin to develop some of the more general elementary theory of modal
model theory, working in Mod(T ) for an arbitrary first-order theory T , beginning
with the fact that L-isomorphisms preserve L truths.
Renaming lemma 8. For any first-order theory T , isomorphisms of models of
T as L-structures preserve L truth in Mod(T ). That is, if pi : M ∼= N is an
isomorphism of models of T , then for any modal assertion ϕ ∈ L , we have
M |= ϕ[a] ⇐⇒ N |= ϕ[pi(a)].
Proof. The claim of the lemma is clearly true for assertions ϕ in the base language
L. And it is clearly preserved by Boolean combinations and also quantifiers. What
remains is to check the preservation by modal operators. But any extension of
M can be translated to a corresponding isomorphic extension of N , preserving
and extending the isomorphism. And so by induction the lemma holds for all
assertions ϕ. 
Next, we show that L-elementarity is the same as L-elementarity. Observation
21 will show that this isn’t generally true for L -elementarity.
Key Lemma 9. In the class of models Mod(T ) of a first-order theory T ,
M ≺L N if and only if M ≺ L N.
Proof. We shall show by induction on formulas ϕ that if M ≺L N , then
M |= ϕ[a] ⇐⇒ N |= ϕ[a]
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for every ϕ ∈ L, for all models. This equivalence is immediate when ϕ is an
assertion in the base language L, and it is clearly preserved through Boolean com-
binations. All that remains for ϕ ∈ L is preservation through modal operators.
The downward preservation of possibility is immediate, since if N |= ϕ[a], then
also M |= ϕ[a], because M ⊆ N and so any extension of N also extends M . To
show the upward preservation of possibility, suppose that M |= ϕ. So there is an
extension M ⊆ H with H |= ϕ. Consider the theory ∆(H) ∪∆0(N) consisting of
the elementary diagram of H together with the atomic diagram of N . That is, we
take every L-assertion ϕ(a0, . . . , an) true in H , using constants for every element of
H , together with the atomic and negated atomic truths ϕ0(b0, . . . , bm) of N , again
using constants for every element of N . This theory is finitely consistent, we claim,
using the fact that M ≺ N . To see this, observe that if ϕ(a0, . . . , an) is true in H
and ϕ0(b0, . . . , bm) is true in N , where ϕ0 is a conjunction of atomic and negated
atomic assertions, then M |= ∃x¯ ϕ0(x¯) and so we may interpret the constants bi
inside M and hence inside H , thereby realizing the conjunction ϕ(a¯) ∧ ϕ0(b¯) in H .
So the theory is consistent, and therefore we have a model H ′ |= ∆(H) ∪∆0(N).
It follows that H ′ is an elementary extension of an embedded copy of H , and a
direct extension of a copy of N . We may assume H ≺L H
′, and so by the induction
hypothesis we know H ′ |= ϕ[a]. Since N embeds into H ′ while fixing a, we therefore
also have N |= ϕ[a]. 
We can use the key lemma to prove a version of it for mere elementary equiva-
lence, as follows:
Theorem 10. In the class of models Mod(T ) of a first-order theory T in language
L, the L-theory of a model determines its L-theory:
M ≡L N if and only if M ≡ L N.
Proof. Suppose that M ≡L N for models of T . It follows that the two models
have a common elementary extension, a model M+ into which both M and N
embed L-elementarily. By the key lemma and the renaming lemma, both of these
embeddings are also L-elementary, and so the L-theories of M and N must be
the same. 
Corollary 11. If T is a complete first-order theory in language L, then in Mod(T )
every L sentence σ is either true in all models of T or none. In this case every
true L sentence σ is necessarily true: σ ↔ σ.
Proof. If T is complete, then all models in Mod(T ) are L-elementarily equivalent,
and so by theorem 10 they are also L-elementarily equivalent. So any L sentence
either holds in all models of T or none. 
We can prove a version of theorem 10 for types.
Theorem 12. In the class of models Mod(T ) of a first-order theory T in language
L, the L-type of individuals a¯ = (a0, . . . , an) in a model M determines the L-type
of those individuals in that model.
Proof. Suppose that a¯ and b¯ have the same L-type in a model M |= T . We may
find an elementary extension M ≺ M for which M is sufficiently homogeneous, so
that some automorphism of M moves a¯ to b¯. By the key lemma, the L-type of
a¯ in M is the same as in M , which by the renaming lemma is the same as the
MODAL MODEL THEORY 9
L-type of b¯ in M , which by the key lemma again is the same as the L-type of
b¯ in M . 
Since theorem 10 shows that the L theory of a model is determined completely
by its L-theory, one might take this to suggest that L assertions are actually L-
expressible. But this isn’t true in general, since we have already seen in theorem 1
that L can express 2-colorability of graphs, whereas this concept is not expressible
in the base language. Nevertheless, the 2-colorability of a graph is a consequence
of the theory of the graph, since it is equivalent to the nonexistence of odd-length
cycles. In the general case what we get is the following:
Theorem 13. In the class Mod(T ) of all models of a first-order theory T in lan-
guage L, every L formula ϕ(x) is equivalent to an infinitary disjunction of in-
finitary conjunctions of L-assertions.
Proof. Let us first consider the case that ϕ is a L sentence. Consider all the
various models M |= T in which ϕ holds. The theorem shows that this depends
only on the L-theory of M , since any other model with that same theory must also
satisfy ϕ. That is, ϕ holds in a model N if and only if the L-theory of N is one of
the theories of a model in which ϕ holds. Let T be the set of all the L-theories T
that are the L-theories of such a model M , one in which T + ϕ holds. By theorem
10, the sentence ϕ is equivalent to the disjunction of these theories T , like this:
ϕ ⇐⇒
∨
T∈T
∧
ψ∈T
ψ.
This is an infinitary disjunction of infinitary conjunctions of L sentences.
Now suppose that ϕ(x) is a formula, with free variables. Let L+ be the language
where x is considered a constant symbol rather than a variable symbol. Every
model of T in L has diverse expansions to L+ simply by interpreting x by an
element. Evaluating a formula with a free variable x under a valuation of that
variable amounts to the same thing as interpreting the corresponding sentence in
a model in which x is regarded as a constant symbol. So the models of Mod(T ) in
L+ are the same thing as models in the language L under a valuation assigning x
to an individual of the model. But in Mod(T ) considered in the language L+, we
may apply the analysis of the previous paragraph to realize ϕ(x) as an infinitary
disjunction of infinitary conjunctions of L+-assertions. So ϕ(x) is equivalent to a
disjunction of conjunctions of formulas of L. 
Perhaps part of what is going on in theorem 13 is the following:
Theorem 14. If T is a theory in a first-order language L having only nonempty
models and L+ is an expansion of L, then for any modal assertion ϕ in L , a model
M of T satisfies ϕ(a) in ModL(T ) if and only if every expansion M
+ of it also does
so in ModL+(T ).
In this theorem, we have two different versions of the potentialist systemMod(T ),
depending on whether you consider L-structures or L+-structures. The point is that
the two systems have the same modal truths for assertions in the unexpanded modal
language L .
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Proof. Every L-model M |= T has expansions to the language L+, and what we
claim is that if M+ is an expansion of M to the language L+, then
M |= ϕ(a) ⇐⇒ M+ |= ϕ(a).
This we prove by induction on ϕ. The claim is clear for L assertions, since ϕ does
not mention any of the new vocabulary of L+. And it is preserved by Boolean
combinations and quantifiers, since the domains ofM andM+ are the same. What
remains is the modal operator. If M |= ϕ(a), then there is an extension M ⊆
N with N |= ϕ(a). We may find an expansion of N to a model N+ extending
M+, simply by interpreting the extra structure first on M as in M+, and then
interpreting it on the rest of N . By the induction hypothesis, N+ |= ϕ(a), and
so M+ |= ϕ(a). Conversely, if M+ |= ϕ(a), then there is some extension N+
of M+ satisfying ϕ(a). The reduct N of N+ to the L language will therefore
satisfy ϕ(a) by the induction hypothesis, and this is an extension of M . So M |=
ϕ(a). 
In a countable language L, there are at most continuum many theories T com-
pleting T , and so theorem 13 provides an at-most-continuum size disjunction of
countable conjunctions of L sentences. By considering the negation, we would also
get a representation of ϕ as a size-continuum conjunction of countable disjunctions
of L-sentences. Can these infinitary disjunctions and conjunctions be reduced to
countable? We suspect not in general.
Question 15. In the class Mod(T ) for a first-order theory T in a countable lan-
guage L, is every L assertion equivalent to an assertion of Lω1,ω?
But there are some important cases where the answer is actually positive, in a
very strong way. Recall that a theory T admits quantifier elimination with respect
to a language if every assertion in that language is equivalent in Mod(T ) to a
quantifier-free formula. Similarly, a theory T admits modality elimination with
respect to a language, if every assertion in that language is equivalent in Mod(T )
to a modality-free assertion. A stronger notion would be the modality trivialization,
which holds over a language if ϕ(x) is equivalent specifically to ϕ(x) in Mod(T )
for every ϕ in that language.
Theorem 16. If a theory T admits quantifier elimination with respect to its lan-
guage L, then it admits simultaneous quantifier and modality elimination—every
assertion in L is equivalent in Mod(T ) to a Boolean combination of atomic formu-
las. Furthermore, the theory admits modality trivialization over L , so that ϕ(x)
is equivalent to ϕ(x) for any assertion ϕ ∈ L .
Proof. Let us prove by induction on formulas that every formula ϕ(x) in the full
modal language L is equivalent in Mod(T ) to a quantifier/modality-free assertion.
Since T admits quantifier elimination, we know this is true for the L formulas. And
this property is preserved by Boolean connectives, as well as by quantifiers, which
can subsequently be eliminated. So suppose that ϕ(x) is quantifier/modality-free
and consider ϕ(x). This holds in a model M if and only if there is an extension
M ⊆ N |= T with N |= ϕ[a]. But since ϕ is quantifier/modality-free, this will be
absolute back to the original model, so M |= ϕ[a], as desired.
It now follows generally that ϕ(x) is equivalent to ϕ(x), since if ψ(x) is the
quantifier/modality-free formula equivalent to ϕ(x), then ϕ(x) is equivalent to
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ψ(x), which is equivalent to ψ(x) since ψ is quantifier/modality-free, and this is
equivalent to ϕ(x). So ϕ(x) is equivalent to ϕ(x) for any ϕ(x) in L . 
A theory T is model complete if every instance of the submodel relationM ⊆ N
for models of T is an elementary submodelM ≺ N . This is a weakening of quantifier
eliminability, for it is equivalent to the property that every formula in L is equivalent
in models of T to a universal assertion [Hod93, theorem 8.3.1].
Theorem 17. For any first-order theory T , the following are equivalent:
(1) T admits modality trivialization over all assertions in L .
(2) T admits modality trivialization over all assertions in L.
(3) T admits modality trivialization over all assertions in L.
(4) T is model complete.
Proof. (1→ 2→ 3) Immediate.
(3→ 4) Assume that modalities trivialize in Mod(T ) over assertions in L. Sup-
pose thatM ⊆ N are models of T . If N |= ϕ(a) for some a ∈M , thenM |= ϕ(a),
which by modality trivivialization means that M |= ϕ(a), and so M ≺ N . So the
theory is model complete.
(4→ 1). Assume that the theory T is model complete. We shall show by induc-
tion on formulas that ϕ(x) is equivalent in Mod(T ) to ϕ(x) for every assertion
ϕ ∈ L . Suppose that the claim is true for ϕ and all subformulas of ϕ. It follows
that ϕ(x) is equivalent to the modality-free assertion ϕ∗(x), obtained from ϕ by
deleting all its modal operators. Thus, ϕ∗ is an assertion of L. IfM |= ϕ(a), then
there is some extension M ⊆ N with N |= ϕ(a), which by our assumption means
that N |= ϕ∗(a). By the model completeness of T , it follows that M |= ϕ∗(a), and
consequently also M |= ϕ(a). So the modality has trivialized, as desired. 
The following example shows that modality elimination is a strictly weaker prop-
erty than modality trivialization.
Observation 18. There is a theory T that is not model complete and consequently
does not admit modality trivialization, but it does admit modality elimination—
every assertion in L is equivalent in Mod(T ) to an assertion in L.
Proof. Let T be the theory of a dense linear order having a least and greatest ele-
ment. This is not model complete, because one can have a suborder M ⊆ N which
changes the particular element that is least or greatest, and so this will not be an
elementary submodel. So by theorem 17 the theory does not admit modality trivial-
ization. But we claim that the theory does admit modality elimination. Indeed, we
claim that every assertion in L is equivalent to a Boolean combination of atomic
assertions and assertions that particular variables are least or greatest. These kinds
of assertions are closed under Boolean combinations, and one can handle the quan-
tifier case just as in the elimination of quantifiers argument for endless dense linear
orders. Finally, consider ϕ(x0, . . . , xn), where ϕ is such a Boolean combination.
By putting ϕ into disjunctive normal form and then distributing the over the
disjunction, we may assume that ϕ is a conjunction of atomic or negated atomic
assertions and assertions that particular variables xi are or are not least or greatest.
But true atomic facts are necessarily true; an element x is possibly least if and only
if it is actually least; it is possibly greatest if and only if it is actually greatest; and
every x is possibly not least and possibly not greatest. These observations allow us
to express ϕ without the modal operator. 
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Theorem 17 shows that modality trivialization over L is equivalent to trivial-
ization over L and L . The corresponding fact for modality elimination is the
following:
Theorem 19. Every first-order theory T admits modality elimination for assertions
in L if and only if it does so for L .
Proof. The converse implication is immediate. For the forward implication, suppose
that T admits modality elimination for L-assertions. We now prove inductively
that every assertion ϕ(x) of L is equivalent in Mod(T ) to an L-assertion ψ(x). This
is true for the L-assertions themselves, and it is preserved by Boolean combinations
and quantifiers. Also, it is preserved by the modal operator , precisely because
ψ(x) is an assertion of L, if ψ ∈ L, and we have assumed that T eliminates
modalities for L assertions. 
The Lo¨wenheim number of a language with respect to a class of models is the
smallest cardinal κ such that any assertion ϕ of that language that is satisfiable in
a model of the class is satisfiable in such a model of size at most κ.
Theorem 20. For any first-order theory T , the upward and downward Lo¨wenheim-
Skolem theorems hold in Mod(T ) with respect to L, using the same cardinals as
for L. That is, every model M |= T has L-elementarity extensions and sub-
models of all the same cardinalities as it does for L-elementarity. Consequently the
Lo¨wenheim number of L with respect to Mod(T ) is the same as for L with respect
to Mod(T ).
Proof. This is immediate from the key lemma and the classical Lo¨wenheim-Skolem
theorem, since the key lemma shows that L-elementarity is the same as L-
elementarity. So any L-elementary substructure or extension is also L-elementary.

Let us now begin to observe that many of the properties we have proved for the
intermediate modal language L do not extend to the full modal language L .
The main lesson seems to be that L is in many respects closer to L than it is to
L . Nevertheless, some classical model theoretic principles fail even for L.
Observation 21. The equivalence stated in the key lemma does not hold generally
for elementarity in the full modal language L . In modal graph theory, there can be
elementary substructures that are not L -elementary and not even L -elementarily
equivalent.
Proof. Consider the class of all graphs. By the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorem, we
can have M ≺L N , where M is a countable graph and N is uncountable. But
by theorem 5, countability is L∼ expressible for graphs, showing the failure of
M ≺L∼ N and indeed of M ≡L∼ N . 
The same example establishes the following:
Observation 22. The equivalence stated in theorem 10 does not generally extend
to equivalence in the full modal language L . In modal graph theory, there can be
elementarily equivalent models that are not L -elementarily equivalent.
We are not sure whether corollary 11 extends to the full modal language L .
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Question 23. Is there a complete first-order theory T for which not all models in
Mod(T ) have the same L theory?
One candidate may be to take T as the theory of true arithmetic, and then argue
somehow that in a nonstandard model of T one can define the standard cut in
the modal language and be thereby enabled to make assertions about the standard
system of the model in L . But we have not yet been able to make this idea work.
Observation 24. Theorem 12 does not hold generally for types in the full modal
language L —in modal graph theory, the L-type of an individual in a model of T
does not necessarily determine the L type of that individual in Mod(T ).
Proof. Consider the class of graphs. Let G be a graph consisting of two stars,
one with center vertex a having countably infinitely many neighbors and one with
center vertex b having uncountably many neighbors, and no other vertices or edges.
a b
The types of a and b are the same in the language of graph theory, but they are not
the same in the language of modal graph theory, which can express the fact that a
has only countably many neighbors, while b has uncountably many. 
Observation 25. The statement of theorem 13 does not generally hold for asser-
tions in the full modal language L . In modal graph theory there are L -expressible
assertions that are not equivalent to any infinitary Boolean combination of L as-
sertions.
Proof. Theorem 5 shows that countability is expressible in modal graph theory, but
the assertion that the graph is uncountable cannot be equivalent to any infinitary
Boolean combination of sentences in the language of graph theory, since the truth of
such assertsion is preserved from an uncountable model to a countable elementary
substructure. 
Observation 26. The conclusion of theorem 20 does not hold generally for the full
modal language L . In modal graph theory, no uncountable graph has a countable
L -elementary substructure, and the Lo¨wenheim number for modal graph theory in
the language L∼, if it exists, is enormous.
Proof. The first part of this is an immediate consequence of the fact that count-
ability is expressible in L , as shown in theorem 5. Every countable submodel will
satisfy the countability assertion, but the whole uncountable graph will not.
The Lo¨wenheim number of modal graph theory must be at least as large as every
cardinal κ whose size is expressible in modal graph theory. By the results of section
2, these cardinals reach to the continuum, and in section 7 we shall prove that they
exceed the first i-fixed point and indeed the first i-hyper-fixed point. 
Observation 27. The compactness property can fail for L-theories (and hence
also for L theories). Specifically, there is a theory T in the language of modal graph
theory L∼ that is finitely realized in the class of graphs but not fully realized.
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Proof. Let T assert that the graph is not 2-colorable, but that there are no cycles
of length 1, none of length 2, none of length 3, and so on—there are no cycles of
any particular finite length n. This theory is expressible in L∼, since theorem 1
shows that 2-colorability is expressible in L∼, and the assertion that there is no
n-cycle is expressible in L∼ as a separate assertion for each n.
This theory is finitely satisfiable, because if only finitely many sizes of cycles are
ruled out, we can satisfy the assertion with a large enough odd cycle, which will
not be 2-colorable. The theory altogether, however, is not satisfiable, since every
cycle-free graph is 2-colorable. One can color every node by the parity of the length
of the shortest path to a given fixed node in each connected component. 
One can also naturally construct a violation of compactness using the fact that
finiteness is expressible, since one can consider the theory asserting that the graph is
finite, but has size at least n for every particular finite n. This theory would indeed
be finitely realizable and not realizable in the class of graphs. Since finiteness is
expressible only in L∼, however, this way of arguing would get the violation of
compactness only in this stronger language, rather than in the weaker fragment
L as we have above.
Although we have presented these examples as violations of compactness, there
is another sense in which we have not violated compactness here. Namely, to
satisfy an assertion of the modal language does not mean just to provide a model
M in which it is true in the potentialist system Mod(T ), but rather, to provide a
whole new potentialist system, a class of models with an accessibility relation, not
necessarily Mod(T ) under direct extensions. The observation above, in contrast, is
about realizing a theory in a graph of Mod(T ), but always working in this same
Kripke model. For this reason, one might look upon the counterexamples as akin to
violations of saturation in this Kripke model, rather than violations of compactness
for the modal logic.
Observation 28. The  Los´ theorem for ultraproducts can fail for assertions in
the modal language L. Specifically, in modal graph theory there is a statement
ϕ ∈ L∼ that holds in some graphs Gn, but fails in every nonprincipal ultraproduct∏
nGu/U .
Proof. Let the graphs Gn be odd-length cycles of increasing size. None of these
graphs is 2-colorable, but the ultraproduct consists of uncountably many discon-
nected Z-chains, and this is 2-colorable. 
4. A quibble about the accessibility relation
We should like to dispense with a certain issue about the accessibility relation in
Mod(T ), for there are actually two natural accessibility relations for Mod(T ). On
the one hand, it is natural to define possibility as we have above, as direct extension
possibility, using the submodel or direct extension relation M ⊆ N , defining that
M |= ϕ[a] if and only if there is a model N with M ⊆ N and N |= ϕ[a].
This accessibility relation is very natural from the perspective of potentialism, by
which one views each of the various models as a fragment approximating the larger
universe to which they are building. On this account, individuals come into actual
existence in a world and then persist through all subsequent larger worlds.
On the other hand, it is also natural to define a variant of this possibility notion
using embeddability M ⊂
∼
N in place of direct extensions M ⊆ N . Namely, the
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embedded extension possibility operator is defined by: M |= ϕ[a] if and only if
there is an embedded extension M ⊂
∼
N , that is, a model N with an embedding
j :M → N , for which N |= ϕ[j(a)]. Thus, every individual in M has a counterpart
inN via the embedding. Notice that there may be more than one embedding j ofM
into N , and so the models M and N alone do not necessarily determine the coun-
terpart correspondence of their individuals, but rather the particular embedding
j :M → N .
As an accessibility relation, the embedded extension relation M ⊂
∼
N exhibits
far better algebraic closure properties than direct extension M ⊆ N . For example,
in nontrivial cases the direct extension relationM ⊆ N is not directed, and neither
does it exhibit amalgamation or convergence (see definitions in section 5), since two
different extensions might happen to use the same individual object in incompatible
ways. But the embedded extension relation often has all of these features, since
the particular identity of individuals no longer matters when they are embedded
into another common structure. From this perspective, the embedded extension
relation is often more robust algebraically.
In terms of modal assertions, we are glad to say that in light of theorem 29
the entire issue is moot, because although as accessibility relations the notions are
different, nevertheless it turns out that the corresponding modal operators coincide.
In this sense, we can equivalently think of possibility with respect to either notion,
and the result will be the same.
Theorem 29. In Mod(T ) for any first-order theory, direct extension possibility
and embedded extension possibility are equivalent for assertions ϕ in the full modal
language L with parameters from M .
M |= ϕ[a] ⇐⇒ M |= ϕ[a]
Similarly, direct extension necessity and embedded extension necessity are also equiv-
alent.
M |= ϕ[a] ⇐⇒ M |= ϕ[a]
Proof. We aim to prove that M |= ϕ[a] if and only if M |= ϕ[a]. The forward
direction is immediate, since direct extensions M ⊆ N are instances of embedded
extensions j : M → N using the inclusion embedding j(x) = x. Conversely, if
M |= ϕ[a], then there is some embedded extension j :M → N with N |= ϕ[j(a)].
The modelM is isomorphic via j with the range of the embeddingM ′ = j "M , and
this model directly extends to N . So M ′ |= ϕ[j(a)], and therefore M |= ϕ[a]
by the renaming lemma, as desired. The necessity case now follows by duality. 
It follows inductively that complex formulas involving and have the same
meaning as the corresponding assertions using and .
Going beyond this, Sam Adam-Day has proved (in forthcoming work) that the
two potentialist systems are actually bisimilar, which completely explains why they
exhibit the same modal truths.
Theorem 30 (Adam-Day). For any first-order theory T , the potentialist systems
consisting of Mod(T ) under the direct extension relation or under the embedded
extension relation, are bisimilar. Therefore, they exhibit exactly the same modal
truths.
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5. Modal validities
One of the central research tasks of modal model theory is to discover the modal
principles and validities that hold in a given potentialist system and the models in it.
This has been the focus of prior work on set-theoretic potentialism [Ham03], [HL08,
HL13], [HLL15], [HL19], [HW19], [HW17], and arithmetic potentialism [Ham18].
In modal model theory generally, we should like to move beyond set theory and
arithmetic to the models of any given theory, to graphs, groups, fields, orders, and
what have you. We aim to discover which modal principles are valid in Mod(T ) for
a first-order theory T , considering this as a potentialist system. A key definition is
the following:
Definition 31. A modal assertion ϕ(p1, . . . , pn), with propositional variables pi,
is valid at a worldM in a potential systemW for an allowed language of instances,
if all substitution instances ϕ(ψ1, . . . , ψn) arising for ψi in that language are true
at M in W .
Thus, a modal validity ϕ(p0, . . . , pn) stands as a template scheme for all the
modal truths ϕ(ψ0, . . . , ψn) that arise by substituting the propositional variables pi
with allowed substitution assertions ψi. Whether a modal assertion is valid or not
is often highly sensitive to the particular language of allowed substitutions ψ, for
instance, whether we are allowing ψ only from the language L, or from L or L ,
or whether parameters from the model M are allowed. When speaking of a modal
validity, therefore, one must take care to clarify precisely the class of substitution
instances for which validity is asserted.
For this reason, we should particularly like to emphasize that when we say a
modal theory such as S4.2 is valid in a model M of a potentialist system, we are
treating S4.2 as a propositional modal theory, that is, as a set of assertions in
propositional modal logic P , rather than as a logic, as a proof system with rules
of inference. In general, because the validities are sensitive to the precise class
of substitution instances and the allowed parameters, they do not always interact
well with the inference rules typically used when defining a modal logic, if those
rules would be taken to be applicable generally in the broader predicate-logic modal
context with variables and quantifiers. For example, a modal principle ϕ(a) can
be valid at a model M using any parameter a from that model, but not valid in
some extensionM ⊆ N using a parameter from the extension N (see remarks after
theorem 39 for a specific example). In this case, ∀xϕ(x) will be valid at M , but
not ∀xϕ(x), and therefore the validities at M are not closed under necessitation,
even when the modal theory S5 is valid there in the sense of definition 31.
Let us begin by reviewing some easy lower bounds. Consider the potentialist
system consisting of the class Mod(T ) of all models of a fixed first-order theory T .
Before stating the theorem, we recall some useful terminology, particularly on the
distinction between convergence and amalgamation. The class of models Mod(T )
exhibits embedding convergence, if for any model M and embeddings M ⊂
∼
N0
and M ⊂
∼
N1, then there is a model N with N0 ⊂
∼
N and N1 ⊂
∼
N . Convergence
is thus a form of local directedness, since it asserts that models N0 and N1 have
a common embedding extension, provided that these models are themselves em-
bedding extensions of a common model M . Note that for convergence there is no
requirement that the diagram of embeddings commutes. This is the key difference
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between convergence and amalgamation and is why convergence leads only to va-
lidities for sentences rather than also for assertions with parameters. Namely, the
class of models has amalgamation, if whenever j0 : M → N0 and j1 : M → N1
are embeddings, there there are embeddings h0 : N0 → N and h1 : N1 → N to a
common model N , such that the diagram commutes, meaning h0 ◦ j0 = h1 ◦ j1.
Theorem 32.
(1) The modal theory S4 is valid at every model in Mod(T ) with respect to all
substitution instances, as is every instance of the converse Barcan formula:
∀xϕ(x)→ ∀x ϕ(x)
(2) If the class of models of T is convergent under embeddability ⊂
∼
, then S4.2
is valid at every model in Mod(T ) for L -sentences.
(3) If the class of models of T exhibits amalgamation, then S4.2 is valid at every
model M in Mod(T ) for L -assertions with parameters from M .
(4) If the models of T are linearly pre-ordered by embeddability ⊂
∼
, then S4.3 is
valid at every model M in Mod(T ) for L -assertions with parameters from
M .
Note that the theorem is concerned with the convergence and amalgamation
properties using the embedding extension relation ⊂
∼
, rather than direct extension
⊆, and this is important, since ⊆ is almost never convergent, while in important
cases the embedding extension relation ⊂
∼
exhibits both convergence and amalga-
mation.
Proof hints. We leave the proof details as an exercise in modal reasoning for the
reader. For the first part of statement (1), use that the direct extension relation ⊆
is reflexive and transitive; for the converse Barcan scheme, use that the domains are
inflationary with respect to the accessibility relation. For statement (2), the main
fact is that convergence is sufficient to establish the validity of ϕ → ϕ for
any sentence ϕ, using theorem 29 to transfer from ⊂
∼
to ⊆. If there are parameters
involved, however, as in statement (3), then one should use amalgamation to verify
ϕ(a) → ϕ(a); the commutativity of the diagram enables one to know that
it is the same a being referred to around both sides of the diagram. For statement
(4), linearity is sufficient to verify the validity of the S4.3 axiom ( ϕ ∧ ψ) →
[ (ϕ ∧ ψ) ∨ (ψ ∧ ϕ)]. 
Let us turn now to the more difficult issue of providing upper bounds on the
validities of a potentialist system. A general method has emerged in a series of
papers [HL08], [HLL15], [HL19], [HW19], [HW17], [Ham18], developing the control
statement technique of establishing upper bounds on the modal validities of a po-
tentialist system. With this method, as in theorem 33, one uses the existence of
various kinds of control statements in the potentialist system—buttons, switches,
dials, ratchets, or railyards—to establish upper bounds on the class of modal va-
lidities of the system.
The main advantage of the control statement method is that it enables one to
analyze and discover the modal validities of a potentialist system by using princi-
pally only expertise in the subject matter of the object theory, rather than tech-
nical expertise in the foundations of modal logic. To construct control statements
for potentialist conceptions in set theory, group theory, or graph theory generally
requires only set-theoretic, group-theoretic, or graph-theoretic ideas, respectively.
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With those ideas and with theorem 33, one can often establish important facts
about the modal validities of one’s potentialist conception.
Let us quickly review some of the key kinds of control statements. A button is a
statement ϕ that is possibly necessary, that is, for which ϕ; it is pushed when
ϕ holds, otherwise unpushed. A switch is a statement ψ for which ( ψ∧ ¬ψ).
A dial is a sequence of statements d1, . . . , dn, such that necessarily, exactly one
of the statements is true, and any of them is possible. A ratchet is a sequence of
button statements r1, . . . , rn such that each is possibly necessary, each necessarily
implies the previous, and
∧
k<n (¬rk+1∧ rk), so that each can be pushed without
pushing the next. A railway switch is a statement r for which both r and ¬r
are possible. A railyard is an assignment of statements to a finite tree pre-order,
such that the possibility relations of the statements are exactly in accordance with
the tree order. A family of control statements are independent, if necessarily they
can be operated without interference with one another. For example, a family
of buttons and switches are independent, if necessarily, one can push exactly any
desired button (and no others) while not affecting the switches and also one can
set the switches as desired without pushing any buttons.
As we had mentioned, the significance of the existence of these kinds of control
statements in a potentialist system is that they provide natural upper bounds on
the collection of validities, as summarized in the following theorem:
Theorem 33. Assume W is a potentialist system.
(1) If a world M in W has arbitrarily large finite families of independent
switches, then the modal validities at M are contained within S5.
(2) If a world M in W has arbitrarily large finite families of independent but-
tons and switches, or independent buttons and dials, then the modal validi-
ties are contained within S4.2.
(3) If a worldM inW has arbitrarily long ratchets, independent of switches and
dials (as many as desired), then the modal validities are contained within
S4.3.
(4) If a world M in W admits railyard labelings of every finite pre-tree, then
the modal validities at M are exactly S4.
In each case, the relevant language of substitution instances would be any language
containing the control statements and closed under Boolean connectives.
For proof of theorem 33, we refer the reader to [HLL15] for statements (1), (2),
and (3), and to [Ham18] for statement (4).
Let us illustrate these ideas in the case of modal graph theory.
Theorem 34. In graphs,
S4.2 ⊆ modal validities of graphs ⊆ S5.
Indeed, for validities with respect to substitution instances in the language of graph
theory with parameters, every graph validates either exactly S4.2 or exactly S5, and
both cases are realized. Specifically:
(1) The modal theory S4.2 is valid in any graph for any assertion at all, with
parameters.
(2) The validities of any graph, with respect even just to substitution instances
for sentences in the language of graph theory, is contained within S5.
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(3) Some graphs have their validities exactly S4.2, with respect even just to
sentences in the language of graph theory.
(4) Some graphs have S5 as valid, even for assertions in the full modal language
of graph theory L∼, with parameters.
(5) For validities with respect to substitution instances in the language of graph
theory with parameters, every graph validates either exactly S4.2 or exactly
S5.
Proof. For the S4.2 lower bound, it suffices by theorem 32 to observe that the class
of all graphs exhibits the amalgamation property. And indeed it does, since if graph
G embeds into graphs H0 and H1, then we may take copies of H0 and H1 extending
G and for which the sets of respective new vertices are disjoint. We may then form
a graph H with embedded copies of H0 and H1, which therefore amalgamate over
G as desired.
For the S5 upper bound, it suffices to show that every graph admits arbitrarily
large finite dials. Let dn be the graph-theoretic assertion that there are exactly n
isolated points, and let d≥N assert that there are at least N isolated points. These
are assertable by sentences in the first-order language of graph theory. For any
finite number N , we may consider the statements dn for n < N and d≥N , which
together form a dial, since every graph either has some specific number of isolated
points n < N , or else it has at least N isolated points; and every graph can be
extended to a graph making any one of these dial statements true.
To show that the lower bound of S4.2 is realized, it suffices to find a graph
admitting arbitrarily large finite families of independent buttons and dials. We can
use the dials dn mentioned just previously, and for buttons, let bk (for k ≥ 3) assert
that there is a cycle of length k in the graph. This is a button, since every graph
can be extended to a graph with a k-cycle, and once there is a k-cycle, then it
remains in all larger extension graphs. Furthermore, these buttons and dials are
independent, since we may add any number of isolated points without changing the
existence of k-cycles, and we may add any k-cycle without changing the number of
isolated points. If a graph lacks k-cycles for infinitely many k, then these buttons
will be unpushed, and consequently the validities of the graph will be contained
within S4.2 and hence identical to S4.2, as claimed for statement (3).
Statement (4) will follow from theorem 35 in the next section from the observa-
tion that the class of graphs is closed under unions of chains. Theorems 39 and 41
identify exactly the graphs that validate S5.
Statement (5) will similarly be proved in the next section with corollary 40. 
6. Maximality principle
A model M in a potentialist system satisfies the maximality principle with re-
spect to a language when it satisfies all instances of the S5 axiom ϕ→ ϕ for ϕ
in that language. Our goal in this section is to determine necessary and sufficient
conditions for a modelM to satisfy the maximality principle with respect to various
languages.
Let us begin by establishing in very general circumstances that there will be
some models validating S5.
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Theorem 35. Suppose that W is a potentialist system.
(1) If every countable chain of extensions in W has an upper bound in W, then
every model can be extended to one that validates S5 with respect to any
fixed countable family of substitution instances.
(2) If every (set-sized) chain of extensions in W has an upper bound in W,
then every model can be extended to one that validates S5 with respect to
sentences in any fixed set-sized language.
(3) If every (set-sized) chain of extensions in W has its union in W, then
every model can be extended to one that validates S5 with respect to any
fixed set-sized language, allowing parameters.
Proof. For statement (1), assume that the potentialist system has every countable
chain bounded. Fix the assertions ϕ0, ϕ1,. . . that will be used for substitution, and
consider any model M0. If this model thinks ϕ0, then there is an extension
M0 ⊆ M1 with M1 |= ϕ0. Thus, we have pushed this button. Now, push each
next button in turn: if Mn |= ϕn, then extend to Mn ⊆ Mn+1 |= ϕn. Thus,
we build a chain of models.
M0 ⊆M1 ⊆M2 ⊆M3 ⊆ · · ·
By assumption, there is a model N extending every model Mn in the chain. The
key observation is that N |= ϕn → ϕn, since if ϕn is possibly necessary over N ,
then it was possibly necessary at stage n and therefore pushed earlier, making ϕn
necessary in N , as desired.
For statement (2), it is a similar idea, but with a longer chain. Enumerate the
sentences as ϕα for α < δ, and assume that every chain in W of size at most δ
has an upper bound. Start in any model M0, and then push button ϕ0, if possible,
by finding an extension M1 |= ϕ0. Continue to M1, M2, pushing each button in
turn, if possible. At limit stages ξ, we use the chain hypothesis to find a model Mξ
extending all earlier Mα for α < ξ. In this way, we build a chain of models Mα, for
α < δ, such that ϕα is pushed in Mα+1, if it is possibly necesssary over Mα.
M0 ⊆M1 ⊆M2 ⊆ · · · ⊆Mα ⊆ · · ·
Using the chain hypothesis a final time, there is a model Mδ extending the chain.
Any statement ϕα that is possibly necessary over Mδ was possibly necessary over
Mα, and therefore made necessary in Mα+1 and hence is still true in Mδ. So Mδ
validates all instances of the maximality principle for these sentences.
Statement (3) is a bit more subtle, since we are allowing parameters. Because
the models are growing in size, we cannot seem to predict in advance how many
buttons we will need to push. Nevertheless, we will be able to catch our tail using the
continuity assumption and an iteration of iterations. Assume that the potentialist
system is closed under unions of chains. Validating the S5 axiom p→ p amounts
essentially to a closure operation, and so there will be a model validating every
required instance. Start in any modelM0, and then using the method of statement
(2), we may push all the buttons ϕ(a) that arise overM0 using parameters a ∈M0
for statements ϕ in any set-sized language. Thus, we’ll find a modelM1 satisfying all
instances of the S5 axiom using parameters in M0. We can similarly find a further
extension M2 satisfying the instances of S5 using parameters in M1. Continuing in
this way, consider the sequence of extensions
M0 ⊆M1 ⊆M2 ⊆ · · · ⊆Mn ⊆ · · ·
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whose limit Mω =
⋃
nMn is a model in W by our closure assumption, and it will
satisfy all instances of S5 using any parameters in Mω, as desired. 
In the case of Mod(T ) for a first-order theory T , this result plays out as follows.
Corollary 36.
(1) For any first-order theory T , every model of T can be extended to one in
which S5 is valid in Mod(T ) for all sentences in L or indeed any set-sized
language.
(2) If the theory is ∀∃ axiomatizable, then every model of it can be extended to
one in which S5 is valid in Mod(T ) for all assertions in L or indeed any
set-sized language, with parameters.
Proof. A simple compactness argument shows that every chain 〈Mα | α < θ〉 of
models of T has an upper bound in Mod(T ). Simply consider the theory consisting
of T together with the atomic diagrams
⋃
α<θ∆0(Mα). This theory is finitely
consistent, and hence consistent, and any model of it provides an upper bound for
the chain. Therefore, by theorem 35, every model of T can be extended to a model
in which S5 for any set of sentences in any set-sized language.
For statement (2), if the theory is ∀∃ axiomatizable, then unions of chains of
models of T will be models of T , placing us into the continuity case of theorem 35,
statement (3). In this case, therefore, we can find a limit model that will validate
S5 for any fixed set-sized language, allowing parameters from the model. 
One cannot in general omit the requirement of the ∀∃ axiomatization, in light
of the following observation, which provides an ∃∀ theory T having no models that
validate S5 for L with parameters.
Observation 37. There is an ∃∀ axiomatizable first-order theory T for which
Mod(T ) admits no models with the maximality principle with parameters.
Proof. In the language of graph theory, let T assert that “there is a node adjacent
to all other nodes,” and consider the resulting potentialist system Mod(T ) of graphs
having this property. No graph like this can satisfy the maximality principle with
parameters, since it is possibly necessary that any given node a lacks an edge to
some other node, since we can extend the graph by adding a node to which a
is not adjacent, even while adding a new universally adjacent node in order to
satisfy T . 
A similar example would be the theory of dense linear orders with a least
element—it is a button to make any particular element non-least. Both of these
theories have ∃∀ axiomatizations, and it seems that this argument will work with
any truly ∃∀ theory. Such theories are not closed under unions of chains, and this
is how they escape the conclusions of statement (3) in theorem 35 and statement
(2) of corollary 36.
We would now like to understand more precisely which models validate S5, and
to do so, let us begin with modal graph theory, which illustrates the central ideas
in a concrete manner. The countable random graph is (up to isomorphism) the
unique countable saturated graph. This graph is characterized by the finite pattern
property, which asserts that for any two disjoint finite sets of vertices A and B,
there is a vertex v adjacent to every vertex in A and to no vertex in B. The
finite pattern property allows you to find a new node satisfying exactly any desired
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pattern of connectivity to finitely many previous nodes, and by iterating this in a
back-and-forth manner, one can easily show both that any two countable graphs
with this property are isomorphic and also that any graph with this property is
universal for all countable graphs.
Theorem 38. A countable graph G satisfies the maximality principle
ϕ(a¯)→ ϕ(a¯)
for all ϕ in the language of graph theory with parameters a¯ ∈ G if and only if G is
the countable random graph.
Proof. (→) Suppose that G satisfies the maximality principle assertion with pa-
rameters. Every instance of the finite pattern property has the form
∃x (
∧
i
x ∼ ai) ∧ (
∧
j
x ≁ bj),
with finitely many parameters ai, bj ∈ G. Every such statement is possibly neces-
sary, since we can extend the graph to add such a vertex, if necessary, and once
there is one, it remains in all further extensions. So by the maximality principle,
this statement must already be true in G. And so G fulfills the finite pattern
property, and since it is countable, it is therefore the countable random graph.
(←) Suppose that G is the countable random graph. We aim to show that G
satisfies the maximality principle. To show this, suppose that G |= ϕ(a¯) for
some a¯ = (a0, . . . , an) from G. So there is an extension graph G ⊆ H such that
H |= ϕ(a¯). By theorem 20, we may assume that H is countable. Therefore H
embeds into G by the universality of the countable random graph, and furthermore,
we can find such an embedding that fixes the parameters in a¯. So G extends the
image of H under that embedding, and so G |= ϕ(a¯), as desired. 
We can mount several refinements of this theorem. The argument actually shows
that the countable random graph exhibits the maximality principle for assertions
in the modal language L∼, not just L∼. And conversely, having the maximality
principle merely for existential assertions in the language of graph theory is sufficient
to ensure the finite pattern property; so these all will be equivalent. In addition,
we didn’t use countability as such, but rather merely the finite pattern property
(which together with countability characterizes the countable random graph), and
so a more erudite version of the theorem is the following:
Theorem 39. The following are equivalent for any graph G.
(1) The graph G satisfies the maximality principle ϕ(a¯) → ϕ(a¯) for every
assertion ϕ in the modal language of graph theory L∼, allowing parame-
ters a¯ = (a0, . . . , an) from G.
(2) The graph G satisfies the maximality principle ϕ(a¯) → ϕ(a¯) for every
assertion ϕ in the language of graph theory L∼, allowing parameters a¯ =
(a0, . . . , an) from G.
(3) The graph G satisfies the maximality principle ϕ(a¯) → ϕ(a¯) for every
existential assertion ϕ = ∃xϕ0(x, a¯) in the language of graph theory, with
ϕ0 quantifier free, allowing parameters a¯ = (a0, . . . , an) from G.
(4) The graph G fulfills the finite pattern property.
Proof. (1→ 2→ 3) These implications are immediate.
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(3 → 4) Every instance of the finite pattern property is a possibly necessary
existential statement, which must therefore already be true in the graph.
(4 → 1) This is the main part of the argument; we argue as in theorem 38.
Suppose that G fulfills the finite pattern property and satisfies ϕ(a¯) for some
ϕ ∈ L∼, with parameters a¯ from G. So there is a graph extension G ⊆ H |=
ϕ(a¯). The theory ∆(G)∪∆0(H) is consistent, since any finite part of ∆0(H) can
be realized inside G over the parameters a¯ by successive uses of the finite pattern
property. Any model N of this theory will have G ≺ N and H ⊆ N . Because of
the latter, we will have N |= ϕ(a¯), and therefore by the key lemma, we will deduce
G |= ϕ(a¯), since ϕ is in L∼. 
Theorem 39 shows that a model can validate S5 for assertions in L with pa-
rameters, while this fails in an extension (using parameters of the extension). For
example, the countable random graph certainly fulfills the finite pattern property,
but if we were to add a new isolated vertex, we would of course no longer fulfill the
finite pattern property.
Corollary 40. For any graph G, the validities of G with respect to the language of
graph theory with parameters is either exactly S4.2 or exactly S5.
Proof. This corollary amounts to theorem 34 statement (5). If G fulfills the finite
pattern property, then the validities of G are exactly S5 by theorem 34. So suppose
that G does not fulfill the finite pattern property. So there are finitely many
a0, . . . , an and b0, . . . , bm for which there is no vertex x connected to every ai and
to no bj . This is an unpushed button. For any other vertex u not amongst the ais
and bjs, we may consider the statement asserting that there is a vertex adjacent
to every ai and also to u, and to none of the bj . This also is a button, which is
unpushed in G, and these buttons are independent, since one can push any one
of them without pushing any of the others. And furthermore, these buttons are
independent of the dials asserting that there are exactly k isolated points or at least
N isolated points, as in theorem 34. So we’ve found arbitrarily large independent
families of buttons and dials, and so by theorem 33 the validities of G are contained
within S4.2. But since S4.2 is valid in any graph, the validities of G are exactly
S4.2, as desired. 
Let us now also prove a parameter-free version of theorem 39.
Theorem 41. The following are equivalent for any graph G.
(1) The graph G satisfies the maximality principle ϕ→ ϕ for all sentences
ϕ in the modal language of graph theory L∼.
(2) The graph G satisfies the maximality principle ϕ→ ϕ for all sentences
ϕ in the language of graph theory L∼.
(3) The graph G satisfies the maximality principle ϕ→ ϕ for all existential
sentences ϕ = ∃x0, . . . , xn ϕ0(x0, . . . , xn), with ϕ0 quantifier free in the
language of graph theory L∼.
(4) The graph G is universal for finite graphs.
Proof. (1→ 2→ 3) These implications are immediate.
(3→ 4) The assertion that G contains an isomorphic copy of a given finite graph
is a possibly necessary existential statement, since we can add such a copy to any
given graph, and so it must already be true in G, if G satisfies the maximality
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principle for such assertions. So any such graph G as in statement (3) is universal
for finite graphs.
(4 → 1) Suppose that G is universal for finite graphs. We want to prove that
it fulfills every instance of the maximality principle ϕ → ϕ for sentences ϕ in
the modal language of graph theory. Assume G |= ϕ. This means that there
is an extension G ⊆ H for which H |= ϕ. Consider the theory Th(G) ∪ ∆0(H),
taking the elementary theory of G in the language of graph theory (sentences only,
no parameters) together with the atomic diagram of H (using names for every
element of H). This theory is finitely consistent, since any finite part of H can be
realized inside G by finite universality. So the theory is satisfied in some graph,
which because of Th(G) will satisfy the full theory of G and because of ∆0(H) will
contain a copy of H . So there is a model N of this theory, which we may take as a
direct extension H ⊆ N . Since N extends H , it follows that N |= ϕ. And since N
satisfies the theory of G, it follows from theorem 10 that G |= ϕ. So G satisfies all
instances of the sentential maximality principle, as desired. 
We should like now to generalize this analysis to arbitrary theories, not just
graph theory. What is really going on? The model-theoretic feature in play here is
existential closure. A model M is existentially closed with respect to a theory T , if
every existential statement ∃x0, . . . , xn ϕ(x0, . . . , xn, a¯), with ϕ quantifier-free, that
is true in some extension M ⊆ N |= T + ∃x¯ ϕ(x¯, a¯), with parameters a¯ from M , is
true already in M .
Theorem 42. In the potentialist system Mod(T ) for any theory T in a first-order
language L, the following are equivalent:
(1) M |= ϕ(a¯)→ ϕ(a¯) for formulas ϕ ∈ L with parameters a¯ from M .
(2) M |= ϕ(a¯)→ ϕ(a¯) for formulas ϕ ∈ L with parameters a¯ from M .
(3) M |= ϕ(a¯) → ϕ(a¯) for existential formulas ϕ = ∃x¯ϕ0(x¯, a¯) ∈ L, with
ϕ0 quantifier free and parameters a¯ from M .
(4) M is existentially closed in Mod(T ).
Proof. (1→ 2→ 3) These implications are immediate.
(3 → 4) Any instance of existential closure is a possibly necessary existential
statement, since once an existential statement becomes true, it remains true in all
further extensions.
(4→ 1) Suppose that M is existentially closed in Mod(T ). We aim to prove the
maximality principle in M for assertions in the modal language L with parame-
ters. Suppose that M |= ϕ(a¯) for such an assertion ϕ. So there is an extension
M ⊆ H |= T with H |= ϕ(a¯). Consider the theory ∆(M) ∪ ∆0(H), consisting
of the full elementary diagram of M together with the atomic diagram of H . This
theory is finitely consistent, since any finite combination of atomic assertions true
in H must already be realizable in M , since it is existentially closed. So there is
a model N of this theory, which we may take to have M ≺ N and H ⊆ N . Since
H ⊆ N , we know that N |= ϕ(a¯), and since M ≺ N it follows by the key lemma
that M |= ϕ(a¯), as desired. 
This theorem has a consequence when every model in Mod(T ) validates S5.
Corollary 43. For any first-order theory T , the following are equivalent:
(1) S5 is valid in Mod(T ) at every model, with parameters, for assertions in L .
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(2) S5 is valid in Mod(T ) at every model, with parameters, for assertions
in L.
(3) S5 is valid in Mod(T ) at every model, with parameters, for assertions in L.
(4) T is model complete.
(5) The modally trivializing logic p ↔ p (and so also p ↔ p) is valid in
Mod(T ) at every model, with parameters, for assertions in L .
Proof. (1→ 2→ 3) Immediate.
(3→ 4) If S5 is valid in Mod(T ) at every model, with parameters, for assertions
in L, then by theorem 42, it follows that every model of T is existentially closed.
But [Hod93, theorem 8.3.1] shows that the models of T are all existentially closed
if and only if the theory is model complete.
(4→ 5) If the theory T is model complete, then by theorem 17, we have modality
trivialization in the full modal language L .
(5→ 1) If modalities trivialize in L , then p↔ p is valid at every world, for
assertions with parameters. In particular, ϕ(a)→ ϕ(a) will hold at every world
of Mod(T ) for assertions ϕ in L , with parameters. 
Corollary 44. For any first-order theory T , the modal validities of Mod(T ) for
assertions in L, L, or L , with parameters, are never exactly S5.
Proof. Corollary 43 shows that if S5 is valid in Mod(T ) at every world for any
of those languages, with parameters, then p ↔ p and p ↔ p are also valid.
But these latter validities are not part of S5, and so the modal validities are not
exactly S5. 
We can similarly establish a parameter-free version, defining that a model M is
sententially existentially closed in Mod(T ) if wheneverM ⊆ N |= T and N satisfies
an existential sentence ∃x0, . . . , xn ϕ0(x0, . . . , xn), with ϕ0 quantifier free, then the
sentence is already true in M . In graph theory, this is equivalent to being universal
for finite graphs.
Theorem 45. In the potentialist system Mod(T ) for any theory T in a first-order
language L, the following are equivalent:
(1) M |= ϕ→ ϕ for sentences ϕ ∈ L.
(2) M |= ϕ→ ϕ for sentences ϕ ∈ L.
(3) M |= ϕ → ϕ for existential sentences ϕ = ∃x0, . . . , xn ϕ0(x0, . . . , xn)
with ϕ0 quantifier free in L.
(4) M is sententially existentially closed in Mod(T ).
Proof. (1→ 2→ 3) These implications are immediate.
(3 → 4) Any instance of sentential existential closure is a possibly necessary
existential sentence, which by statement (3) must be true in M .
(4→ 1) Suppose thatM is sententially existentially closed in Mod(T ). To verify
the sentential maximality principle, suppose that M |= ϕ for some sentence
ϕ ∈ L. So there is an extension M ⊆ H |= T with H |= ϕ. Consider the theory
Th(M) ∪∆0(H) consisting of the theory of M (no parameters) together with the
atomic diagram of H , using names for every element of H . This theory is finitely
consistent, since any finite part of the atomic diagram of H is realized inside M
by sentential existential closure. So there is a model N of the theory, which has
M ≡ N and H ⊆ N . Since H ⊆ N , we know that N |= ϕ, and since M ≡ N , it
follows by theorem 10 that M |= ϕ, as desired. 
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Note that if a first-order theory T is complete, then corollary 11 shows that the
modally trivializing logic σ ↔ σ is valid in Mod(T ) for sentences σ in L. In
particular, the maximality principle σ → σ will also be valid for such sentences.
Observation 46. The maximality principle for assertions in the intermediate
modal language L is not necessarily equivalent to the maximality principle in
the full modal language L . In the class of graphs, the countable random graph
satisfies the maximality principle for L∼ with parameters, but it does not satisfy
the maximality principle for L∼, even merely for sentences.
Proof. We have already proved that the countable random graph satisfies the max-
imality principle in the language L∼ with parameters. But this does not extend
to the full modal language L∼ because the countable random graph is countable,
whereas being uncountable is a possibly necessary statement of L∼, since every
graph can be extended to an uncountable graph, and once a graph is uncountable,
this remains true in all further extensions. 
In light of the results of sections 2 and 7, any graph satisfying the maximality
principle in the full modal language L∼ must be enormous, because it is a button
that the graph exceeds in size any of the cardinalities that we proved to be express-
ible in this language, such as the first i-hyper-fixed-point cardinal. Indeed, because
of the uncertain status of question 54, it is not clear whether we can even define
in ZFC a truth predicate for modal graph-theoretic truth in the full language; and
without such a truth predicate, it is not sensible to assert the maximality princi-
ple in that full modal language. For this reason, the maximality principle in the
full modal language may be subject to the subtle metamathematical difficulties we
discuss in section 9.
7. The interpretative power of modal graph theory
We should like now to demonstrate the strength of modal graph theory by prov-
ing that it can interpret various other mathematical theories and structures.
Let us begin with finite modal graph theory, where we consider the potentialist
system consisting of all finite graphs. This is a proper class, but if desired one can
reduce to a set by considering the finite graphs using a vertex set contained in the
set of natural numbers N. By the renaming lemma, any modal truth in the class
of all finite graphs will be realized in these kinds of graphs, and so modal truth is
not affected by this restriction.
Theorem 47. True arithmetic is interpretable in finite modal graph theory. There
is a translation ϕ 7→ ϕ∗ from arithmetic sentences ϕ to sentences of modal graph
theory ϕ∗, such that 〈N,+, ·, 0, 1, <〉 |= ϕ if and only if ϕ∗ holds in every finite
graph in the class of finite graphs.
Proof. The strategy will be to represent numbers within graph theory and then
to show that the arithmetic operations and structure are definable in modal graph
theory. To begin, we shall represent the numbers with graphs of the following form:
0 1 2 3 4
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We represent each number n with a vertex (in red) whose neighbors form a cycle of
length n+3. Our use of this +3 offset enables a convenient absoluteness property:
if a vertex represents a number in a graph, then in any extension of this graph
where it still represents a number, it must represent the same number as originally.
(This wouldn’t have been true, for example, had we represented 0 with an isolated
node or 2 with a node adjacent to two adjacent nodes.) So we represent n with
an (n + 3)-cycle. A node encodes a number exactly when it’s neighbors form a
nonempty connected set with all vertices of degree 2, and this is expressible in the
language of finite modal graph theory.
The arithmetic order relation n ≤ m on these representations is expressible in
the language of finite modal graph theory. Namely, if we have a representation of
n and a representation of m, then n ≤ m if and only if possibly, there is a node
whose neighbors are each adjacent to distinct neighbors of n and m, in such a way
that these associations form an injection from all but three neighbors of n with at
most all but three neighbors of m, like this:
n m
This particular figure illustrates that 4 ≤ 5. We can similarly express that n and
m represent the same number, by asserting that the association uses all but three
neighbors of each vertex.
We can also express that n+m = r for number representatives using the language
of finite modal graph theory. We simply say that possibly, they all still represent
numbers and there is such a one-to-one correspondence from all but three neighbors
of n and all but three neighbors of m with all but three neighbors of r. And we can
express that nm = r, by asserting that possibly, they all still represent numbers
and there is a node adjacent to nodes that are each adjacent to a distinct node of
r, and to neighbors of n and m, in such a way that except for three neighbors each
of n, m and r, every pair of nodes from n and m arises exactly once in association
with a neighbor of r.
Finally, let us explain how to translate arithmetic assertions to finite modal graph
theory. Every arithmetic assertion is equivalent to an arithmetic assertion in which
there are no compound terms, so that all atomic formulas have the form x+ y = z,
x · y = z, x = y, x < y, x = 0, or x = 1, where x, y and z are variable symbols.
We can translate these into the language of finite modal graph theory by asserting
that x, y and z code numbers obeying the relevant identity, as we described above.
Next, we extend the translation recursively:
(¬ϕ)∗ = ¬ϕ∗
(ϕ ∧ ψ)∗ = ϕ∗ ∧ ψ∗
(∃xϕ)∗ = ∃x
( ∧
v∈FV(ϕ)
v represents a number ∧ ϕ∗
)
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In the exists case, we include the assertion that all the variables of the formula
still represent numbers, since we only want to consider extensions in the which the
other parts of the graph still represent numbers. This is where it is important that
our number representation is absolute under extensions.
It now follows by induction that the truth of an arithmetic sentence ϕ in N is
equivalent to the truth of the modal graph translation ϕ∗ in any particular finite
graph. 
Since one can encode finite graphs into arithmetic, it follows that we can also
make a converse translation of finite modal graph theory into arithmetic, and so
these theories are mutually interpretable. They are actually bi-interpretable, since
each can see how it is that it is encoded into the translated copy of the other,
although we shall not formulate a precise notion of bi-interpretation of models and
potentialist systems here.
Corollary 48. Arithmetic is interpretable in modal graph theory, using the class
of all graphs (not just finite graphs).
Proof. The point is that since theorem 3 shows that finiteness is expressible in
modal graph theory, we can define the class of finite graphs within the class of all
graphs, and therefore we can define the finiteness modal operators Fin and Fin
of true in some finite extension and true in all finite extensions, respectively. 
Let us consider next the case of countable modal graph theory. Let Hω1 be the
set of all hereditarily countable sets, the sets having a countable transitive closure.
This is a model of ZFC−, meaning Zermelo-Frankael set theory without the power
set axiom (but see [GHJ16] concerning a subtlety about the axiomatization). We
shall show that truth in the hereditarily countable sets is interpretable in countable
modal graph theory. Let us denote by Γ⊕ Λ the disjoint sum of graphs Γ and Λ.
Theorem 49. Hereditarily countable set theory is interpretable in countable modal
graph theory. We shall represent hereditarily countable sets with countable graphs
and vertices and define a translation ϕ 7→ ϕ∗ of set-theoretic assertions ϕ to modal
graph-theoretic assertions ϕ∗, such that
〈Hω1 ,∈〉 |= ϕ(a0, . . . , an) ⇐⇒ Γ0 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Γn |= ϕ
∗(aˆ0, . . . , aˆn),
where (Γi, aˆi) is a countable graph and vertex representing the set ai.
Proof. Every hereditarily countable set a is an element of a countable transitive
set t, such as the transitive closure of its singleton TC({a}). The structure 〈t,∈〉
is a countable set with a well-founded extensional relation ∈, and every such well-
founded extensional relation on a countable set is isomorphic to a countable tran-
sitive set via the Mostowski collapse.
We define that a graph code for a hereditarily countable set is a graph consisting
of a node t, whose neighbors are related by a well-founded and extensional relation
x y, defined to hold when there are nodes between x and y as depicted here:
x
y
In addition, there shall be a copy of ω in the sense of theorem 5 together with a
bijection of the copy of ω with the neighbors of t and the nodes used in the
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relation. The property of being a graph code is expressible in modal graph theory,
because the extensionality of is expressible directly without modal operators
by the assertion that distinct neighbors of t have distinct sets of -predecessors
amongst the neighbors of t, and the well-foundedness of is expressible by the
assertion that necessarily, in any extension in which the copy of ω is still a copy of
ω and still provides a bijection with the neighbors of t and the supplemental nodes
used in the relation, then there is no node whose neighbors are a set of neighbors
of t having no -minimal element. Note that we use the bijective copy with ω to
ensure that in the graph extension, there are no new neighbors of t and no new
instances of the relation; this is a form of absoluteness in our representation
similar to what we had used in theorem 47 in the finite case. In addition, there will
be a vertex xˆ pointing at t and at one of the neighbors x of t. The graph, together
with the vertex xˆ code the set that would result from the image of x under the
Mostowski collapse of the relation on the neighbors of t.
We can express that two graph codes (Γ, x) and (Γ′, x′) code the same set by
asserting that possibly, there is a node pointing at nodes that are each adjacent to
a node in Γ and to a node in Γ′, as in the proof of theorem 47, in such a way that
they make a isomorphic correspondence between -downward closed subsets of Γ
and Γ′, which furthermore associates x with x′. It will follows that the set coded
by x via Γ will be the same as the set coded by x′ via Γ′. Similarly, we can express
that one code (Γ, x) codes an element of another (Λ, y), if (Γ, x) is isomorphic to
the code formed by a -predecessor of y in Λ. This tells us how to interpret the
atomic formulas x = y and x ∈ y in terms of the codes. And we can simply extend
the interpretation recursively through Boolean connectives and quantifiers as in
theorem 47, establishing the equivalence stated in the theorem by induction. 
Corollary 50. Second-order arithmetic is mutually interpretable with countable
modal graph theory.
Proof. Second-order arithmetic is bi-interpretable with the structure 〈Hω1 ,∈〉, and
this latter structure can define representations of any countable graph up to iso-
morphism. By the renaming lemma, the modal truths of any countable graph are
the same as for the copies available in Hω1 , and so this structure can interpret
countable modal graph theory. 
We could have used this set-theoretic representation even in the case of finite
modal graph theory, representing every hereditarily finite set with a finite exten-
sional relation relation on a set together with a bijection to a finite cycle (thereby
providing the absoluteness). This would show that 〈Hω,∈〉 is interpretable in finite
modal graph theory.
But similarly, let us use the method on larger cardinals. The key requirement is
a notion of stability for the cardinality in question. Let us define that a cardinal κ
is stably representable in modal graph theory if there is a property φ expressible in
modal graph theory with the following properties:
(1) There is a graph G with a vertex v satisfying φ(v).
(2) If φ(v) holds in a graphG of a vertex v, then v has exactly κmany neighbors
in G.
(3) The truth of φ(v) in G depends only on the induced subgraph consisting of
v and its neighbors and the neighbors of the parameters (suppressed).
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(4) If φ(v) holds in G and also in an extension graph H , then v has the same
neighbors in G as in H .
This was the key property of our representation of ω that enabled the absoluteness
feature we used in theorem 49.
Theorem 51. If a cardinal κ is stably representable in modal graph theory, then
〈Hκ+ ,∈〉 is interpretable in modal graph theory.
Proof. We can use the same method as in theorem 49, except using a bijection
with a stable representation of κ, rather than a copy of ω. In this way, we rep-
resent sets in Hκ+ using well-founded extensional relations on sets of size κ, with
a distinguished vertex pointing at the set being represented. Once again, we can
express the equivalence of codes and the set membership relation on the codes in
the language of modal graph theory. 
Since Hκ is definable inside Hκ+ , it follows that we can also interpret 〈Hκ,∈〉 in
modal graph theory, when κ is stably representable.
Theorem 52.
(1) If κ is stably representable in modal graph theory, then so is κ+.
(2) If κ is stably representable in modal graph theory, then so is 2κ.
(3) If κ is stably representable in modal graph theory, then so are ℵκ and iκ.
(4) If κ is stably representable in modal graph theory, then so is the next i-
fixed-point above κ.
(5) If κ is stably representable in modal graph theory, then so is the first i-
hyper-fixed-point above κ—the first cardinal λ that is the λth i-fixed-point
above κ.
Proof. Suppose that κ is stably representable. We shall represent κ+ by a vertex
pointing at κ+ neighbors that are well-ordered by the relation, with the first κ
many of them fulfilling the stable representation of κ, and such that every node
u amongst the κ+ beyond κ is adjacent to a node that points at nodes forming a
bijection between the -predecessors of u and the κ initial segment of the order.
That is, the whole order does not have size at most κ and not only do all these
initial segments have size κ, but they come equipped already with the bijections
witnessing that they have size κ. We can assert easily that is a linear order;
to assert that it is a well-order, we just have to claim that in every extension in
which the copy of κ remains stable and the -relation is still a linear order and the
bijections of initial segments are still bijections with κ, there is no node pointing at
a nonempty set with no -minimal element. If this is true, then it really must be a
well-order, and if it is a well-order, then because of the stability with κ, none of the
nodes in the order can gain new predecessors; and the κ+ size order itself cannot
gain new elements on top of all the previous nodes, because then those nodes would
have κ+ many predecessors and therefore could not exhibit a bijection with the set
of size κ. So we have a stable copy of κ+ and so it is stably representable.
To stably represent 2κ, we begin with a stable representation of κ, together with
a node P whose neighbors are each adjacent to distinct subsets of the set κ many
nodes, and such that furthermore, necessarily, in any extension in which the size
κ set fulfills its definition, if a node is adjacent to a subset of the set of size κ,
then some neighbor of P already realizes that same subset. The point is that if the
neighbors of P did not already represent the full power set, then we could extend
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by adding a node pointing out the missing the subset, and it would violate this
necessity requirement. But if P does represent the full power set, then any new
pattern will already be represented. So we have a stable representation of P (κ),
which has size 2κ.
If κ is stably representable, then we can stably represent a copy of κ that is
well-ordered by ; this is simply a set of size κ that is linearly ordered by ,
such that in every extension in which the copy of κ is stable (so that the order has
gained no new elements), there is no node pointing at a set having no -minimal
element; and such that every proper initial segment of the order has size less than
κ, which is to say, that in no extension in which κ is preserved is there a bijection
of κ with an initial segment of the order. So we have now a stable representation
of a well-order of length κ. To represent iκ, we associate the least element of the
κ-sequence with a copy of ω, and at each successor node, we associate the power
set of the previous node; and at limit nodes, we associate a set that is exhibited in
bijection with the union of the prior sets. Since our copy of κ is stable, we will have
therefore iteratively and stably represented the iteration of the power set. Finally,
we assert that there is a vertex whose neighbors are placed into bijection with all
the associated sets at each stage; this will be a stable representation of iκ. We
can stably represent ℵκ in a similar manner, simply by representing the successor
cardinal at each step instead of the power set.
We now iterate this to find a stable representation of the next i-fixed point.
Consider the least i-fixed point, which is the cardinal θ = sup θn, where θ0 = ω
and θn+1 = iθn . To stably represent this, we have a copy of ω pointing out nodes
to represent each θn, each with a well-order, and then at each θn+1 we assert that
the previous construction has been already arranged, so that the node representing
θn+1 is pointing out a set of size iθn , along with a well-order of it. The point is
that this whole iteration is sufficiently uniform that we can describe that a graph
has carried out the whole construction to reach the limit node, which is the i-fixed
point. To find the next i-fixed point after a given stably representable cardinal,
we simply start with θ0 representing κ+ 1, rather than ω.
Similarly, since the process of representing the next i-fixed point is stably rep-
resentable, we can represent the process of iterating it sufficiently to find the first
hyper-fixed-point. 
Theorem 52 has consequences for the possibility or impossibility of Lo¨wenheim-
Skolem conclusions in modal graph theory. Because these various sizable cardinals
are expressible in modal graph theory, they form bounds on the sizes of possible
elementary substructures and extensions. A comparatively small graph, after all,
cannot be elementary in a large one in modal graph theory, if the size of the small
graph is expressible in the language of modal graph theory.
The theorem shows that the set-theoretic structures Hω , Hω1 , Hω2 , Vωωω+5 and
so on are all interpretable in modal graph theory. And indeed much more.
Corollary 53. Set-theoretic truth in Vθ, where θ is the first i-hyper-fixed point, is
interpretable in modal graph theory.
Proof. The theorem shows that the first i-hyper-fixed point is stably representable,
and so theorem 51 shows that Vθ, which is the same as Hθ, is interpretable in modal
graph theory. 
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And we may proceed similarly to the next i-hyper-fixed point, the next hyper-
hyper-fixed point, and so on. These will all also be stably representable, and so we
can interpret set-theoretic truth for a quite a long way into the cumulative hierarchy.
In this sense, modal graph theory can serve as a foundation of mathematics.
Does it ever stop?
Question 54. Is set-theoretic truth, that is, truth in the full set-theoretic universe
V , interpretable in modal graph theory?
The key obstacle concerns the question of whether we can find sufficient stable
representations of any given set. It is not clear how to translate definable cardinals
in ZFC, such as the first Σ3-correct cardinal, into stable representations in modal
graph theory.
There is a related question that we have been unable to resolve. In any graph
G, let us denote by Gx the set of neighbors adjacent to a given node x.
• (Equinumerosity problem) Can we express in the language of modal graph
theory that the neighbor set Gx of vertex x is equinumerous with the neigh-
bor set Gy of vertex y?
• (Cardinal comparability problem) Can we express in the language of modal
graph theory that the neighbor set Gx of vertex x has cardinality less than
or equal to the neighbor set Gy of vertex y?
We conjecture that the answers are both negative. A positive answer to the car-
dinal comparability problem, of course, will imply a positive answer to the equinu-
merosity problem.
If it should turn out that contrary to our conjecture, the cardinal comparability
problem has a positive solution, then we would like to mention that we will be
able to express in modal graph theory that a relation such as is well-ordered.
That is, if we have a node whose neighbors are linearly ordered by the relation,
then the relation is well-ordered if and only if it is possible that every node in the
order is adjacent to a set of neighbors, such that the cardinality comparisons of
those neighbor sets agrees with the order. The point is that in ZFC, any set of
cardinal sizes is well-ordered by comparability (this fact is equivalent to the axiom
of choice).
This observation seems important, since the ability to express the well-order
concept in modal graph theory seems likely to be highly relevant for the capacity
of modal graph to interpret set-theoretic truth.
8. Actuality operator @
Let us now discuss the fruitful extension of the modal language by means of
the actuality operator @, which allows one to refer to the actual world and more
generally to the various worlds that are in effect referenced during the course of
interpreting a modal statement. Let us explain the usage and semantics by means
of several examples. The statement (ϕ → (ψ ↔ @ψ)), expressing the assertion
that “necessarily, if ϕ is true, then ψ holds if and only if ψ is actually true.” This
is true in a world w, when in every world u that w can access, if ϕ is true in u,
then ψ is true in u if and only if ψ is true in w. Thus, the @ operator in effect
references truth in the original world w. Let us introduce the predication @x to
mean that individual x is actual, that is, that @∃u u = x, which asserts that x
is an individual of the actual world. Similarly, we introduce the quantifier ∀@x ϕ
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to mean that ∀x (@x → ϕ), or more simply, that ϕ holds (in the current possible
world of evaluation) for all actual x, that is, for all x in the actual world. And the
quantifier ∃@xϕ means ∃x (@x ∧ ϕ), asserting that there is some actual x fulfilling
ϕ in the current possible world of evaluation.
For example, in the modal language of graph theory with actuality, the assertion
∃x∀y (x ∼ y ↔ (@y ∧@∀z ¬y ∼ z))
expresses that it is possible that there is a node adjacent to all and only the isolated
nodes of the actual world.
When the modal depth of the assertion increases, there are several worlds at play
in the semantics of the assertion, and a more complex usage and semantics for @
allows us to refer to them directly. The unadorned @ refers as above to the world in
which the overall statement is being evaluated, and otherwise the subscripts @1, @2
and so on refer to the worlds referenced by corresponding subscripts on the modal
operators. For example, the assertion
( ∃x∀@y Txy) ∧ 1 ∃x∀@1y Txy
asserts that possibly someone is taller than every actual person, and furthermore,
this is necessarily true. The second clause asserts that in every accessible world,
it is possible that someone is taller than everyone in that world, not just in the
original world. The operator 1 here is not a different modal operator than , for
the two necessities themselves have the same meaning; rather, the subscript on 1
tells us to which world @1 will now refer inside the scope of 1.
To illustrate further, consider the assertion that necessarily there are two possible
worlds, such that every individual who is tall in one of them is short in the other.
One might be tempted at first to formulate it like this:
[
1 ∀x(Tx→ @2Sx) ∧ 2 ∀x(Tx→ @1Sx)
]
.
This expression, however, is not well formed; the semantics of it are not composi-
tional, since the @1 does not occur under the scope of 1 and @2 does not occur
under the scope of 1. One can, however, properly express exactly the desired
statement like this:
3 1@3 2
[
@1∀x(Tx→ @2Sx) ∧@2∀x(Tx→ @1Sx)
]
.
In this way, the actuality operator allows for a rich expression of truth and possi-
bility relations between worlds.
In the potentialist system of all graphs, the assertion
1
[
∃x∀y(x ∼ y ↔ @y) ∧ ∃z∀y(z ∼ y ↔ (@1y ∧ ¬@y))
]
is true at a graph G exactly when there is a larger graph G1 with a node x that
is connected to all and only the nodes of G and a further graph G2 with a node z
connected to all and only the nodes of G2 that are in G1 but not in G.
Theorem 55. Both the equinumerosity problem and the cardinal comparability
problem are expressible in the language of modal graph theory with actuality L ,@∼ .
Proof. It suffices to express only the comparability problem. For any graph G, let
Gv denote the nodes in G adjacent to v. The relation |Gv| ≤ |Gw| is expressible by
saying: there is some larger graph H with a node that points at nodes that index
an injective correspondence from the actual neighbors of v to the actual neighbors
of w. This is the same idea as used with ≤ in the proof of theorem 47. 
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The main point we should like to make is that modal graph theory with the
actuality operator can interpret full set-theoretic truth.
Theorem 56. The modal logic of graph theory with actuality can interpret set-
theoretic truth. There is a translation of set-theoretic assertions to modal graph
assertions ϕ 7→ ϕ∗, such that a set-theoretic sentence ϕ is true in the set-theoretic
universe (V,∈) if and only if ϕ∗ is true in the empty graph, or in any particular
graph.
Proof. This theorem follows from the methods used in proving the theorems of
section 7. The main point is that the actuality operator @ will enable us avoid the
need for stable representations, since with @ we can directly refer to the desired
coded structure.
So we may code any set with a node whose neighbors form a set that under the
relation is well-founded and extensional. And so any set is represented by point-
ing to such a well-founded extensional relation and a point in it. As in theorem 51,
we can define equivalence of codes and the set membership relation. And we can
translate set-theoretic assertions into modal graph theory by extending this inter-
pretation of the atomic truths through the Boolean connectives, and interpreting
the set-theoretic ∃x as “ ∃x such that x codes a set,” just as in section 7. 
There are some subtleties about the metamathematical status of this theorem,
since we cannot refer to set-theoretic truth inside set theory. One can interpret the
theorem in ZFC as a theorem scheme, a separate claim about interpreting Σn set-
theoretic truth in modal graph theory, for each metatheoretic n, but always using
the same interpretation method. Alternatively, we can interpret the theorem as a
true theorem in an extension of ZFC to a theory such as KM or just GBC+ETRω,
which proves the existence of first-order set-theoretic truth predicates.
Question 57. Is actuality @ expressible in modal graph theory?
We conjecture not, but we do not know how to prove this. One idea may be
to show that the equinumerosity problem is not expressible in the language of
modal graph theory—perhaps this can be proved by means of modal pebble games.
If successful, this would show actuality is not expressible in modal graph theory,
because with actuality, we can express equinumerosity.
9. Set-theoretic and meta-mathematical issues
Although we have claimed to define the semantics for modal truth in Mod(T ),
the meta-mathematics of this definition involves some set-theoretic subtleties. The
basic problem is that Mod(T ) is a proper class and the recursive definition of truth
is not a set-like recursion. Therefore, we can’t seem to undertake the definition
legitimately in ZFC. But in Kelley-Morse set theory, for example, or even merely in
Go¨del-Bernays set theory with the axiom of elementary transfinite recursion ETR,
or even just ETRω, then we can prove that there is a solution of the recursive
definition of modal truth. We refer the readers to [GHH+20] for further discussion
of the role of ETR in defining truth predicates.
Question 58. In ZFC can one define the satisfaction relation for modal graph
theory for the class of all graphs?
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This question is related to the question whether modal graph theory interprets
set-theoretic truth. If it does, then the answer to this question will be negative, since
by Tarski’s theorem on the non-definability of truth one cannot define first-order
set-theoretic truth within first-order set theory.
Theorem 59. No ZFC-definable class defines the satisfaction relation for modal
graph theory with actuality, that is, a truth predicate for the class of graphs in L ,@∼ .
Proof. By theorem 56, set-theoretic truth is interpretable in modal graph theory
with actuality. So by Tarski’s theorem on the non-definability of truth, there can
be no definable truth predicate. 
Meanwhile, in the stronger class-based theories such as KM or GBC + ETR,
there is a satisfaction class for first-order set-theoretic truth, and with this we can
define the satisfaction relation for modal graph theory with actuality. To our way of
thinking, the necessary set-theoretic difficulty of defining the modal semantics for
a potentialist system such as Mod(T ) poses a philosophical difficulty for advocates
of potentialism seeking a simplified, reduced ontology, for it is as difficult to define
the modal semantics for modal graph theory with actuality, for example, even when
one’s ontology is reduced to having only a set-sized graph at a time, as it is to define
the semantics for full-blown set-theoretic truth. Even ZFC cannot do it. In this
sense, it seems impossible for the potentialists to have the parsimonious ontology
they seek, if they also wish to have a coherent potentialist semantics.
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